Introduction
Over the last decades, different theories of organizational culture have been developed, various characteristics of organizational culture have been identified [1] and several definitions have been suggested based on the way people think (e.g., values, attitudes, beliefs) and/or behave [2] . Safety culture is an aspect of organizational culture, and was firstly introduced in the frame of the investigation of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. Since then, numerous studies have attempted to define, and conceptualize safety culture, thus leading "… to different ideas about the best means of developing a safety culture and thus also about the means of developing safety.'' [3] . Regardless the diversity of studies, it seems that there has not been a framework integrating the safety culture characteristics referred in the literature and providing a holistic approach to safety culture development.
Despite the lack of academic consensus on the precise definitions and conceptualizations, safety culture is seen as part of a safety management system. Authorities and organizations have recognized the need to plan for initiatives in order to foster safety culture, with the goal of reducing accidents and incidents. This is achieved by ensuring that employees pay attention to risks, are committed to safety, and openly discuss their views. Regional and international bodies of various industry domains have generated their own lists of safety culture dimensions -prerequisites, and regulators have included safety culture as a matter of concern when auditing organizations [3] . However, no study has been conducted about the extent to which guidelines of industry bodies embrace the academic body of knowledge, and how similar those guidelines are to each other.
The purpose of this paper is to present the results of a research project conducted for a European Nuclear Power Plant (ENPP) [4] . One of the main project objectives was to suggest a complete set of safety culture development prerequisites, and compare the relevant ENPP documentation with the guidelines published by the aviation, railway, oil & gas, nuclear, healthcare, military aviation and maritime sectors. The selection of the sectors was made upon request of the ENPP. As part of the study, a comprehensive literature review led to the development of an inclusive theoretical framework, and a gap analysis revealed the distance between industry guidelines and literature as well the differences amongst the industry sectors considered. The analysis framework presented in this paper can be used to establish a common cross-industry approach to the development of safety culture, which is important since professionals might work in different industry sectors during their career and a harmonized approach to safety culture will make the respective transitions more effective and will enable the sharing of good practices between industries. The framework can also function as basis for developing an instrument to assess and benchmark safety culture.
Theoretical background
The safety culture decomposition most widely mentioned in the literature and used by the industry is the one suggested by Reason [5] , who proposed that safety culture consists of five subcultures that must be concurrently in place in order to foster such a culture. Reason's concept was complemented by various authors, who elaborated on the scope of each subculture and provided more detailed guidance about their development and maintenance (table 1). Flexible culture A culture that allows flexibility and reconfiguration when the variability of working conditions and goals cannot be captured by established procedures.
[7], [8] , [9] , [10] Reporting culture A culture where staff from all organizational levels voluntarily report safety hazards and own errors, violations, and deviations.
[6], [9] , [11] , [12] , [13] Informative culture A culture that enables sharing of a variety of safety information across the organisation.
[7], [11] , [14] , [15] Learning culture A culture that draws valuable conclusions from its safety information system, and drives changes in the organisation based on the lessons learned.
[7], [9] , [12] , [14] , [15] In addition to the elements per specific subculture, general prerequisites for safety culture development are described in the literature [7] , [10] , [12] , [13] , [15] , [16] , [17] . The combination of the safety subculture elements and general organizational prerequisites form a set of 36 markers, which comprises the analysis framework presented in table 2 and used in this study. Changes start from the top. There is both written and visible commitment. G2. Leadership.
Leadership is valued as a steering factor towards safety culture development. Leaders adapt and shift between target-oriented and transformational styles. G3. Clear responsibilities and accountabilities of all management areas towards safety.
-G4. Safety department visibly responsible and accountable for safety -Marker Explanatory remarks planning. G5. Employees' involvement.
The companies engage employees to planning, monitoring and improvement activities. A broad workforce representativeness minimizes power distance. A bottom-up approach in decision making is preferred and planned. G6. Non-reliance on past success.
There is no ceiling for safety culture and resilience under a constantly changing environment. G7. Risk management policy.
Decisions about changes and plans are based on a risk management framework, tailored to each level of decision-making. G8. Planning for buffers.
In addition to optimizing resources during planning, there is capacity to cope with the unexpected. This is not seen as resource waste. G9. Rewarding safety initiatives.
Rewarding active and exceptional contribution to safety such as new ideas, voluntary participation in safety plans etc., but not daily performance. G10. Internal communication.
Open communication, questioning attitude and effective conflict management. G11. External communication.
Communication channels with the society, authorities and other sectors. A list of indicative measures and the cases that these might apply is communicated to employees. J4. Prevention of practitioners' stigmatization.
In cases of mistakes / errors (acceptable behavior) that caused adverse outcomes, support is provided to the actors regarding their reintegration. J5. Organizational support in legal disputes.
In cases of "acceptable behavior" subject to police investigations, the organization provides legal, financial and psychological support. There is agreement on risk thresholds and boundary policies that delegate authority to employees for self-organizing. Emergency stop procedures are accessible when safety is compromised. F3. Emergency response and crisis management exercises.
In addition to the planned exercises, the resilience of the system is assessed through unplanned diverse scenarios under different conditions and various actors. Reporting culture (R) R1. Clear policy about reporting.
Definition of "who, what, when, where etc." regarding reporting; communication of potential implications of reporting. Characteristics for maximum potential of a reporting system (note: 6 aspects in total as mentioned in the right column) R2. Voluntary R3. Non-punitive R4. Protected (confidential) R5. User-friendly R6. Accessible (system close to work-station) R7. Timely feedback to reporter. Informative culture (I) I1. A user-friendly safety information system in place with free access for all employees.
-I2. Content of safety information.
Proactive and reactive type of information; internal and external topics. I3. Time for access to safety information is planned in working schedules. I4. Information sharing across teams, units and departments. 
Methodology
The framework of table 2 was used to analyze the safety culture development guidelines of seven industry sectors: nuclear, aviation, healthcare, maritime, oil & gas, railway and defense. The researchers consulted the documentation published by international agencies and organizations per industry sector. In cases that such documents or agencies were not identified, we considered the ones available for the European region, and in case of inadequate resources in Europe, the North American region references were utilized; this decision was made on the grounds that the whole research project regarded a European firm.
If more than one document dedicated to safety culture was available per industry sector, it was decided to assess the one(s) most recently published. Also, wherever there were various documents referring to safety culture development and including references to each other, the researchers analyzed the whole set of such published guidance per sector. Table 3 for provides an overview of the documents consulted per industry sector. For each set of documents per sector, the researchers assessed which safety culture markers of table 2 were present (i.e. conducted a gap analysis). Only the guidance clearly and distinctly linked to safety culture was considered in the analysis; under this approach, general references to safety management were not considered if in the documentation these were not explicitly connected with safety culture. Following the gap analysis, percentages of markers' reference in the guidance per sector were calculated in overall and per safety culture area (i.e. safety subcultures and general prerequisites).
In order to provide a more concrete indication of the extent of alignment amongst industry sectors in overall and per safety culture area, we used the Cochran's Kappa for evaluating the differences amongst all sectors and the Cohen's Kappa for assessing the degree of pair agreements. The former test shows if there is a significance difference amongst binary data sets (i.e. safety culture is referred in the guidance or not). The Cohen's Kappa takes values from 0.00 (complete disagreement) to 1.00 (complete agreement) and takes into account the effects of agreement by chance. The SPSS 22 software package was used, and the significance level was set to α=0.05.
Results
Due to space constraints, this paper only reports the percentages per safety culture area and industry sector, as well the results of the statistical tests in overall for the 36 markers. The Cochran's test showed significant differences amongst the industry sectors when considering all 36 markers (p=0.000); the same test indicated that the highest nonalignment amongst sectors concerned the general prerequisites (p=0.046) and reporting culture (p=0.038). The pair agreements for sectors (i.e. Cohen's Kappa values) for all markers combined are shown in Table 5 . 
Discussion

Planning for safety culture development
Taking into account the definition and scope of each safety culture area and marker, it can be claimed that the set of general prerequisites is the ground on which the organizations can build their safety culture. Furthermore, when considering the five subcultures suggested by Reason, it seems that their operationalization must follow a specific order: Just, Flexible, Reporting, Informative and Learning. More specifically:
1. Just culture corresponds to an operational environment in which workers are dealt with fairness, and unwanted events are judged against predefined and agreed boundaries and not merely against the severity of their outcomes.
2. Given the establishment of a just culture, a flexible culture might be established and the inevitable variability of working conditions and human performance will be recognized. Procedures will be revisited when design assumptions are invalid and/or conflicting goals emerge repeatedly.
3. Flexible and just cultures not only might result to an increase of the amount of the voluntary reports, but they might boost the quality and traceability of such reports. In addition to hazards, staff will share their own errors and experiences sourcing from confrontation with competing objectives and inadequate working conditions. 4. When reporting becomes systematic, a broad range of local safety information will be obtained, that can be shared across the organisation in addition to the information collected through other sources (e.g., audits, safety reviews, safety investigations).
5.
A consistent and effective sharing of safety related information will increase the possibility for the organisation to learn and proceed to targeted and substantiated changes.
Alignment between industry and literature and within industry
The percentages of markers in overall suggest that, in average, the industry guidelines in overall refer to 59% of the safety culture development elements suggested by the literature. In this context, aviation is the sector that includes most of the markers in its guidelines, while the maritime sector includes only one third of those and ranks last amongst the seven industry sectors examined. When considering the individual safety culture areas, in average, just culture is the area least discussed in industry guidelines, whereas the general prerequisites and learning culture are the areas mostly represented. It is interesting that the percentages of markers' presence vary from 0% to 91% across the sectors and safety culture areas, indicating remarkable variances of alignment to the academic references.
The results of the gap analysis suggested that there has been a distance between the academia and the industry regarding safety culture markers, such a distance varying from moderate to large. The fact that this study identified in literature various tangible ways to realize safety culture denotes that academia might generate practical solutions for the industry but those might not be appropriately communicated.
The statistical tests regarding the agreement amongst the industry sectors, revealed that the guidelines of the industry differ highly in the safety culture markers considered. The highest disagreement regards the reporting culture and general prerequisites; it is noticeable that although the latter area is one of the most frequently represented in terms of average percentage of safety culture markers, the industry sectors differ significantly in the sets of general prerequisite markers included in their respective documentation. The pair comparisons revealed low to moderate agreement with Cohen's Kappa values varying from 0.30 to 0.64, where the lowest agreement was indicated between the oil & gas and maritime sectors and the highest agreement regarded the aviation and the healthcare industry sectors.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The framework used in this study was based on a comprehensive literature review and incorporates specific and tangible characteristics that organizations can use to operationalize their safety culture development. Although the researchers sought to build a collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive list of safety culture markers, the framework might be adjusted based on new research and concepts, and will be reevaluated in the frame of an on-going study about safety culture assessment.
Since organizations might already have a set of safety culture markers in place, and need to prioritize their additional efforts under limited resources, it is suggested that they ensure maintenance and valid assessment of the existing safety culture markers and proceed to developing the complete set of markets with a specific order as proposed in the discussion section: General prerequisites, Just, Flexible, Reporting, Informative and Learning cultures.
The gap between literature and industry signifies the need for initiatives in order to bridge theory and practice. This will ensure that the concepts and models developed by the academia serve the needs of the industry, and that research results are retrofitted with practical experience and enable scientists to refine their theories and models. Apart from the distance between professional practice and academia, this research also showed a distance amongst industry sectors. It seems that although safety is a top priority for all industries considered, the way safety culture development is guided differs much across these. Relevant initiatives, efforts, ideas, concepts, solutions and challenges must be shared amongst the various sectors, to establish a common language about safety and facilitate the sharing of practices and experiences across the industry. This becomes increasingly important as professionals work in various industry sectors during their career.
Lastly, in the frame of this study, it is noted that an absence of a safety culture marker in the guidance documentation in an industry does not provide evidence that the respective industry sector does not exploit this marker. There is always some distance between work-as-designed and work-as-done and the practice in individual companies will differ from the guidelines published by industry bodies.
